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I. Introduction 
 
International migration is probably one of the most cited, yet 
also most contested, areas of the so called new security agenda, 
which emerged at the end of the Cold War, and resulted in a 
broadening and deepening of our understanding of what 
constitutes a security threat or challenge. Migration tends to be 
viewed as a security issue in security studies since the 1980s. ‘The 
duality of threats apparently caused by migration to both national 
sovereignty and human security are largely reflected in much of 
the recent academic literature.’1 
 
This essay asks whether migration can justifiably be considered 
a security issue, and under which circumstances this may be the 
case. The essay will first ask which terms help us to understand 
aspects of migration that may be helpful in formulating the claim 
that in some cases migration can be considered a security issue, 
relevant for national security and/or human security. It then asks 
the question ‘whose security’ is relevant in such a debate – the 
security of states or humans? It continues by presenting challenges 
to national security and human security in countries of destination 
but also countries of origin and transit.  
 
 
                                                           
1Thompson, C., 2013. Frontiers and Threats: Should Transnational Migration Be 
Considered a Security Issue?. Global Policy Journal, 20.11. < 
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/20/11/2013/frontiers-and-threats-
should-transnational-migration-be-considered-security-issue > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 
2014] 
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II. What is Migration? What kind of Migration is Relevant? 
 
At its simplest, migration can be understood as the movement 
of people from one place to another. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as ‘The 
movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an 
international border, or within a State. It is a population 
movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, 
whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration 
of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons 
moving for other purposes, including family reunification.’2 It is 
thus a broadly understood phenomenon. While the majority of 
migrants migrate in search of work and economic and social 
opportunities, a relatively small percentage of migrants are people 
fleeing armed conflict, natural disaster, famine or persecution.  
 
Human migration has taken place throughout history and has at 
times been considered as a threat, but more often as an 
opportunity. Significantly, some argue that while migration took 
place from Europe to other parts of the world, it was viewed as 
opportunity, and when the trend reversed to one of immigration 
into Europe, it became associated with the notion of a security 
challenge or threat. It is worth noting that estimates of the volume 
of migration into Europe and other developed countries in the 21st  
century corresponds roughly to the volume of migration outflow in 
the 19th century. What has changed between the 19th and 21st 
centuries is that the process of state consolidation resulted in fixed 
frontiers policed by state authorities, and that European countries 
have become an island of peace, stability and wealth.  
 
The UN reports that the number of international migrants 
worldwide reached 232 million in 2013, up from 175 million in 
                                                           
2IOM, Key Migration Terms. < http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/ 
iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Migration >  [Accessed: 
9 Nov. 2014] 
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2000 and 154 million in 1990.3 As for the European Union, 
EUROSTAT specifies that there are some 20 million non-EU 
nationals residing in the EU countries (making up 4 % of its 
population).4 Thus, the vast majority of migrants globally do not 
reside in European countries. Significantly, polls indicate that 
populations tend to overestimate the numbers of immigrants in EU 
countries. A recent Ipsos Mori poll indicates that for example ‘in 
Italy the public thinks 30% are immigrants when it’s actually 7%; 
and in Belgium the public thinks it’s 29% when it’s actually 
10%.’5 
 
Migration is a phenomenon that must be understood in the 
context of the complex and interlinked flows of goods, finance and 
people. While global flows of goods and finance are supported and 
encouraged as part of a liberalist notion of development, 
commerce and also security, the flow of people is increasingly 
being tackled with a variety of restrictive migration management 
policies which aim at curtailing it.  
 
Indeed, under international law, states are entitled to control 
movement across their borders. It can be argued that ‘states use 
migration control measures to demonstrate their sovereign control 
over territory and to palliate public concerns that sovereignty is 
                                                           
3United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, 2013. The number of international migrants worldwide reaches 232 
million, Population Facts No. 2013/2. < http://esa.un.org/ 
unmigration/documents/The_number_of_international_migrants.pdf > 
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
4EUROSTAT, Immigration in the EU, data from 2014. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/docs/infographics/immigration/migration-in-eu-infographic_en.pdf >  
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
5Ipsos Mori, 2014. Perceptions are not reality: Things that the world gets wrong. 
October. < https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3466/Perceptions-are-not-reality-
Things-the-world-gets-wrong.aspx > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
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being undermined.’6 States determine who can enter and who can 
reside and work in their territories and do so inter alia through 
their migration management and border management policies. 
This entitlement to control who enters and who resides is 
restricted by a number of specific provisions of international law 
and human rights obligations. Furthermore, not all types of 
migration are considered a threat and curtailed, as for example 
migration within the European Union and between developed 
countries is in general not at the focus of restrictive migration 
management and border management policies (although one must 
note occasional attempts by some EU countries to limit intra-EU 
migration and to weaken the so called Schengen regime which 
allows for border-less travel within the EU). 
 
Thus, arguably migration as a broad, generic term does not 
really help us in the effort to explore whether migration is a 
security threat. Clearly, it would be difficult to claim that 
migration overall is a security issue. More specific terms are 
necessary. 
 
The literature on the subject uses several different categories 
and terms for the type of migration that may cause security 
challenges. While some authors attempt to explain differences in 
attitudes towards migrants by discussing a division into acceptable 
and unacceptable migrants7, and polls and studies also point to the 
fact that racial considerations play a role in attitudes towards 
migrants, these categories do not lend themselves easily to a 
discussion of security implications. The most useful categorization 
as far as security studies are concerned may be one that refers to 
the status of migrants. In particular, authors speak of 
                                                           
6International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2010. Irregular Migration, 
Migrants Smuggling and Human Rights: Towards Coherence, p. 2. < 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/56/122_report_en.pdf > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 
2014] 
7Ford, R., 2011. Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to 
Immigration in Britain is Affected by Migrants’ Region of Origin. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37:7, 26.4. 
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undocumented migration8, unauthorized migration, clandestine 
migration9, illegal migration10, and irregular migration. In 
particular such migration is increasingly perceived by the 
governments and citizens of wealthier countries as a security 
threat. Papademetriou argues that ‘(n)o aspect of ... 
interdependence seems to be more visible to the publics of 
advanced industrial societies than the movement of people. And 
no part of that movement is proving pricklier to manage 
effectively, or more difficult for publics to come to terms with, 
than irregular (also known as unauthorized, undocumented, or 
illegal) migration’. 11 Indeed, recent polls also point to this: the 
Migration Observatory’s Report on public opinion on immigration 
in Britain suggests that publics distinguish between legal and 
illegal migration and that opposition to migration if often focused 
on illegal migration.12 
 
While the various terms used by scholars, policy-makers and 
media and listed above are similar in that they refer to those 
migrants who are not authorized by countries of destination (and 
in some cases by countries of origin and transit), many 
reservations have been expressed about the impact these 
formulations may have on the perceptions of such migrants and on 
the consequences of such perceptions for policy-making and the 
welfare of migrants, inter alia. In fact, some authors actually point 
                                                           
8Platform for International Co-operation on Undocumented Migrants, 2014. Who 
are Undocumented Migrants. PICUM. < http://picum.org/en/our-work/who-are-
undocumented-migrants/ > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
9Lutterbeck, D., 2006. Policing Migration in the Mediterranean, Mediterranean 
Politics, Vol. 11, No.1, March. < ftp://budgie6.ethz.ch/gcspmigration09/ 
e/publications/Issues_Institutions/ME_Med/Academic_Papers/Lutterbeck-
Med_Politics-March06.pdf > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
10See for example Collier, P., 2014. Illegal Migration To Europe: What Should 
Be Done? Social Europe Journal, 9.9. < http://www.social-
europe.eu/2014/09/illegal-migration/ > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
11Papademetriou, D.G., 2005. The Global Struggle with Illegal Migration: No 
End in Sight. Migration Policy Journal, 1.9.  < http://www.migrationpolicy.org 
/article/global-struggle-illegal-migration-no-end-sight > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
12The Migration Observatory Report, 2011. Thinking Behind the Numbers: 
Understanding Public Opinion on Immigration in Britain. 16.10., p. 3 and 4. 
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out that all of the terms available do not do justice to the 
phenomenon, and attempt to find new terms (such as ‘desperate 
migration’, or in the context of the Mediterranean ‘boat people’).13 
For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘irregular migration’, which 
although not universally accepted, and not very precise (it 
encompasses a variety of types of migrants: economic migrants, 
asylum seekers, refugees) is used by organizations such as the 
International Organization for Migration14 and the European 
Union15, will be applied. 
 
IOM defines irregular migration as migration that takes place 
outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving 
countries. Thus, ‘from the perspective of destination countries it is 
entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary 
authorization or documents required under immigration 
regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the 
irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses 
an international boundary without a valid passport or travel 
document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for 
leaving the country.’16  
 
It has been noted that the number of irregular migrants have 
been growing. Authors point out that this is the result of several 
                                                           
13See for example Joseph Chamie, former director of the UN Population 
Division, writing on ‘desperate migration’. Chamie, J., 2013. The Dillemma of 
Desperate Migration. Humanitarian aid adds incentives for migrants to take risks 
in fleeing homelands. YaleGlobal, 14.11. < http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ 
dilemma-desperation-migration > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014], and Roderick Pace 
writing on ‘Mediterranean boat people’. Pace, R., 2012. Migration in the Central 
Mediterranean. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 2. 
<https://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/179058/JMProfPacePaper
Migration022013webv3.pdf > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
14IOM, Key Migration Terms.  < http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/ 
home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Irregular-migration > 
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
15European Commission, Home Affairs, 2014. Irregular Migration. 21.8. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-
immigration/index_en.htm > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
16IOM, Key Migration Terms. 
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trends. The first one is increased mobility as a result of 
globalization, and advances in transport and communications, and 
indeed also the general growth of migration. The second one is the 
increasing limitation of legal migration possibilities, as 
governments respond by restrictions. The third is that there is 
substantial mismatch between the supply and demand sides for 
labour. And the fourth is that cases of mass migration often result 
from mass infringements of human rights and conflict, such as is 
the case in Syria, Libya, Iraq or the Middle East. 
 
The actual numbers of irregular migrants globally can only be 
estimated. The IOM indicated in 2010 that ‘(t)he overwhelming 
majority of migration is fully authorized. Estimates, while not 
exact (...), suggest that only some 10–15 per cent of today’s … 
international migrants are in an irregular situation.’17 The EU does 
not provide an estimate of the numbers of irregular immigrants, 
but points to the fact that ‘in 2009, the number of irregularly 
staying non-EU nationals apprehended in the EU was about 570 
000 (7 % less than in 2008)’18.  The Clandestino project provides 
an estimate of the numbers of irregular migrants in the EU for 
2008 as 1.9-3.8 million19. This estimate is used widely in relevant 
literature.  With the EU population reported as 505.7 million20, the 
size of irregular migration cannot in itself really constitute the 
problematic part. Rather, it is the trend of growing numbers of 
migrants and irregular migrants, and it is the lack of clarity and 
control on who enters developed countries and stays in them and 
                                                           
17IOM, World Migration Report 2010. The Future of Migration: Building 
Capacities for Change, p. 29. < http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/ 
free/WMR_2010_ENGLISH.pdf > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
18European Commission, 2014. Irregular Immigration. August. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-
immigration/index_en.htm > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
19ELIAMEP, Clandestino Project Final Report, 2009, p. 15. < 
http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/documentlibrary/126625701EN6.pdf > 
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
20European Commission EUROSTATS, 2014. Population and population change 
statistics. Data from May 2014. < http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/Population_and_population_change_statistics > 
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
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for what purpose, associated with irregular migration, that causes 
real or imagined threat perceptions.  
 
 
III. Whose Security? 
 
 
i. States and Humans 
 
The public debate on the migration-security nexus tends to 
focus on a variety of aspects related to national security, 
understood as the protection and promotion of the well-being of 
the citizens and legal residents of the State and its territory.  As 
Khalid Koser argues, ‘the perception of migration as a threat to 
national security has certainly heightened in recent years, in part in 
response to the rapid rise in the number of international migrants 
(…) and especially of ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ migrants ’.21 There 
are of course other factors that may intensify that threat: if such 
irregular migration is large scale or occurs during periods of 
recession, and so on. Real or imagined links to terrorism, 
organized crime and health threats are at the core of the perception 
of irregular migration as a security threat. Surely security concerns 
of this kind must be taken seriously and migration management 
and border management policies designed to respond are needed. 
However, most authors argue that the relevance of such links tends 
to be overestimated.22 Such threat perceptions also emphasize 
threats to the social and economic fabrics of countries of 
destination. This may be the case, because clearly, migrants ‘are 
also different: they bring new lifestyles and languages, traditions 
and values. Throughout human history, the outsider, the ‘other’, 
has been the focus of suspicion and often hatred.’23  
                                                           
21Koser, K., 2011. When is Migration a Security Issue? Brookings, 31.3. < 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/31-libya-migration-koser > 
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
22Ibid. 
23International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2010. Irregular Migration, 
Migrant Smuggling and Human Rights: Towards Coherence, p. 1-2. < 
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At the same time, the debate on migration and security reflects 
the general trend in security studies to move beyond the national 
security perspective to embrace a human security perspective. 
While the national security perspective focuses on border 
management challenges that may undermine a state’s sovereignty 
as well as migration’s real or imagined threats to the population of 
countries of destination,  human security as an alternative 
approach to migration has placed the migrant as the referent object 
of threats. ‘The structural violence that causes many to migrate, 
the impact of deportation and detention policies and the hazards to 
personal safety of migrants resulting from the increasing 
reluctance of states to offer sanctuary to those genuinely in need 
are just some of the aspects of the nexus between migration and 
human security.’24 Arguably thus, from the human security 
perspective, ‘the main imperative is not to curb migration by all 
possible means but rather to prevent the loss of life in the 
Mediterranean, protect the migrants against the human smugglers 
and ensure the rights of genuine refugees.’25  
 
Koser argues that understanding migration as a national 
security issue has consequences for the kind of policies that are 
used to counter the threat. Thus, it is used to justify ‘greater 
surveillance, detention, deportation and more restrictive 
policies’.26 This in turn has an impact on the human security of 
migrants (by encouraging them to use more dangerous routes, 
using migrant smugglers and human traffickers, limiting the 
possibilities of reaching access to safe countries), and publics (by 
encouraging anti-immigrants tendencies), which in turn also has 
an impact on the human security of migrants. This is certainly true 
for the Mediterranean region. It is for this reason that many 
authors conclude that human security threats to irregular migrants 
by far outweigh the national security threats that they may create. 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/56/122_report_en.pdf > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 
2014] 
24Thompson, Frontiers and Threats. 
25Lutterbeck, p. 64. 
26Koser, When is Migration a Security Issue? 
  69
In fact, the two approaches (national security and human 
security) are often seen as standing in tension with each other. 
Thus, the debate centres on the question of whose security it is that 
we ought to be concerned about – is it really the security of states 
that should be focused on, or should we be studying the impact 
first and foremost on the humans, in this case the irregular 
migrants?  
 
Kerwin argues however pointedly that ‘(h)uman security is 
often set against the concept of national security, but the two need 
not be at odds. Properly crafted national security policies should 
further human security. However, the human security framework 
moves the migration discussion beyond national security’s narrow 
preoccupation with border control, detention, and the 
criminalization of migrants, and opens it to the conditions of 
insecurity that drive irregular and crisis migration. Human security 
also asks whether policies developed out of a misguided view of 
national security put people in less secure positions, like the hands 
of traffickers and smugglers.’27 Thus, adequate migration 
management and border management policies would address 
national security problems while enhancing human security of the 
migrants. This, arguably, is a rather complex task. 
 
 
ii. Security of which States?  
 
Another aspect of the ongoing debate is that work on the 
migration-security nexus focuses to a large degree on security 
challenges to developed countries as countries of destination, and 
a number of scholars point to the fact that the impact on 
developing countries as countries of destination but also of transit 
and of origin is neglected. Migration is of course not purely a 
South-North phenomenon. Indeed, migration routes or pathways 
can be summarized as follows: there are South–North, South–
                                                           
27Kerwin, D., Human Security, Civil Society and Migration. Center for Migration 
Studies of New York. < https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/ 
Kerwin%20statement.pdf > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
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South, North–South or North–North migrations, as the IOM 
outlines in the latest edition of its World Migration Report.28 Most 
migrants (and irregular migrants) do not arrive in European 
countries, but rather in developing countries, either as countries of 
transit or destination, which disproportionately carry the brunt of 
the impact and costs of migration caused for example by the Syria 
crisis or the situation in Iraq. Yet, their voices are hardly heard in 
the debate. 
 
Thus, the Euro-centric nature of the debate concentrates on 
impact on developed countries, even though irregular migration 
affects poorer countries disproportionately harder. From a human 
security, but also from a national security perspective, migration 
management presents a far greater security challenge to weak 
states than to developed states, whether the latter are destination 
countries, transit countries of countries of origin. ‘(L)ess 
developed countries have their own concerns about unauthorized 
migration. These include the seeming gross disregard for the 
human rights, labor rights, and other basic rights of their nationals 
who enter the illegal immigration stream, and the trafficking 
industry that has grown around such movements.’29 It is also the 
brain drain that irregular migration movements cause, and the 
impact on social and economic situation in the countries of origin, 
but also countries of transit. Furthermore, for states of origin, 
irregular migration often is an essential economic factor for both 
their citizens and their economies because of remittances, now 
probably approaching $404 billion (in 2013). The outlook for 
remittances remains strong.30 It is also in some cases a ‘security 
valve’, allowing young people without a perspective in their own 
country to pursue their future elsewhere, thus curtailing the danger 
                                                           
28IOM, 2013. IOM World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Wellbeing and 
Development.  < http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2013_EN.pdf > 
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
29Papademetriou, The Global Struggle with Illegal Migration. 
30The World Bank, 2014. Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and 
Outlook. Migration and Development Brief 22, 11.4., p. 2. < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief22.pdf > 
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of social explosions in countries of origins faced with 
demographic and economic challenges. Significantly, it is these 
perspectives that are often overlooked in the debate on the 
security-migration nexus. 
 
It is clear, that given such different interests, broader policies 
aimed at addressing the security-migration nexus, will have to 
reconcile the positions of developed countries of destination and 
developing countries of destination, transit and origin. Without 
such an effort, the efficiency of EU’s migration management and 
border management policies will be severely limited. Indeed, the 
proper approach to the migration–security nexus needs to focus on 
the needs of developing countries just as much as developed 
countries, and on countries of transit and origin just as much as on 
countries of destination. 
 
 
IV. Consequences of Securitization of Migration 
 
Authors suggest that a securitization process of migrants and 
migration, especially irregular migration, takes place, increasing 
the perception of migration as a threat to national security. 
Securitization is understood as the process in which perceptions of 
security problems emerge and evolve as a result of speech acts. A 
number of authors indicated that migration is one such securitized 
security threat. 
 
Threat perceptions related to migration have heightened in 
recent years, because: 
 
i. The security agenda has been linked to many aspects of 
policy (broadening and widening of the concept of 
security). 
ii. There has been a rapid rise in the numbers of migrants 
crossing borders and especially of irregular migrants. 
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iii. The notion of ‘the war on terrorism’ and other so-called 
transnational threats have been linked to migration31, 
especially irregular migration. 
 
 As Lutterbeck says, ‘(o)ne consequence of this growing 
preoccupation in European countries with irregular 
migration and (supposedly) related transnational 
challenges from across the Mediterranean has been a 
considerable expansion and intensification of policing and 
law enforcement activities in and across the Mediterranean 
sea. ..., this has involved both an increasing deployment and 
upgrading of various types of security forces involved in 
policing the Mediterranean, as well as a considerable 
deepening of law enforcement co-operation between 
countries north and south of the Mediterranean.’32 Apart 
from this, it is used to justify detention, deportation, 
pushback and other restrictive policies.  
 
The irregular migrants from North Africa and sub-Sahara, and 
others making their way to North Africa in order to reach the 
northern shore of the Mediterranean, consequently increasingly 
turn to more dangerous routes and to human smugglers and 
traffickers, and pay exorbitant fees to board dangerously small and 
overcrowded vessels. It also limits their chances of reaching 
access to safe countries. Thousands of migrants have died in 
recent years trying to reach the shores of Italy, Malta, Spain and 
Greece.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
31IOM, 2004. Essentials of Migration Management, Volume Two: Developing 
Migration Policy. Section 2.8. Migration and Security, p. 6. < 
http://www.rcmvs.org/documentos/IOM_EMM/intro/V2Intro_CM.pdf > 
[Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
32Lutterbeck, p.60. 
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V. Situation in the Mediterranean 
 
Indeed ‘the Mediterranean is nowadays considered one of the 
most important gateways through which undocumented 
immigrants seek to reach the EU’. 33 There has been a 
considerable increase of numbers of irregular migrants arriving on 
boats since 2011, especially in Italy, but also other northern 
Mediterranean states. The majority of irregular migrants arrive in 
the EU across the Mediterranean Sea. Frontex, the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
reports that in the second quarter of 2014, some 90% of the 
irregular migrants arriving in the EU were reported from its sea 
border, mostly in southern Italy.34  
 
Frontex suggests also that ‘(i)t has been a truly disastrous year 
for irregular migrants attempting the perilous sea-crossing from 
North Africa to Europe. A troubling spike in serious armed 
conflicts around the world, from Mali in West Africa through to 
Gaza, Syria, Iraq and beyond, has proved a bonanza for the people 
smugglers – with strife-torn Libya now by far the most favoured 
point of departure. The figures are staggering.’35 So far some 2500 
are known to have drowned in 2014 while attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean as irregular migrants. 
 
 The EU response to the situation in the Mediterranean points 
to an unresolved tension between a national security and human 
security approach. While the rhetoric points to both humanitarian 
considerations of saving lives and guaranteeing human rights of 
irregular migrants, and to the need to address the root causes of 
such increased migration (conflicts, human rights abuses, poverty, 
                                                           
33Ibid., p.61. 
34Frontex, 2014. FRAN Quarterly, Quarter 2, April-June 2014., p. 5. < 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2014.pdf 
> [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
35Frontex, 2014. People smugglers: the latter day slave merchants. < 
http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/people-smugglers-the-latter-day-slave-
merchants-uarkn1 > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
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and socio-economic factors such as unemployment in the 
countries of origin), the response focuses largely on measures 
intended to curtail the irregular migration by means of migration 
management and border management. The Italian Mare Nostrum 
operation which, after particularly glaring cases of loss of lives in 
the Mediterranean, provided humanitarian help to boat people in 
need, is scheduled to conclude, although as of 1 November 2014, 
there were conflicting reports on this issue. The EU’s Frontex 
operation Triton that was intended to succeed the Italian operation 
as of 1 November 2014 could only be agreed upon after 
considerable debates among the EU states. The Triton operation 
will be confined to a 30-mile zone around Italy’s coastal waters, 
possess a third of Mare Nostrum’s maritime capacities, and be 
coordinated through Frontex. It is reported that ‘(t)he UK Foreign 
Office stirred ire in Brussels ... when it announced that it would 
not participate in any future operations, because of their “pulling 
factor” in encouraging economic migrants to set sail for Europe’36. 
This stance points to the difficulties in conceptualizing migration 
policies that take into account the human security perspective. Part 
of the explanation may be that, as Joseph Chamie, former director 
of the UN Population Division argues, ‘(w)ould-be host nations 
confront a dilemma: aid adds incentives for more people to 
undertake treacherous journeys.’37  
 
Public opinion and the changing political landscape in a 
number of EU member countries, in which right wing forces 
became stronger in the last number of years, are likely to further 
impact on changing the balance of national security and human 
security approaches towards irregular migration. But the 
securitization of migration, especially irregular migration, poses 
                                                           
36Nelsen, A., 2014. Italian navy says it will continue refugee rescue mission 
despite plan to scrap it. The Guardian, 28.11. 
< http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/italian-navy-refugee-rescue-
mission-mare-nostrum > [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2014] 
37Chamie, The Dillemma of Desperate Migration. 
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significant consequences and hidden costs and creates a vicious 
cycle of supply and demand for security. Such processes serve 
short-term needs but arguably not the long-term interests of the 
developed countries of destination with respect to the preservation 
of human rights and liberal values. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This essay asked the question whether migration can be 
understood as a security issue. It first asked which terms help us to 
understand which aspect of migration may be helpful in 
formulating the claim that in some cases migration can be 
considered a security issue, relevant for national security and/or 
human security. It suggested that it is irregular migration that is 
seen as posing both national security and human security threats. 
While the two perspectives on migration and security are often 
seen as contradictory, they can be brought together inter alia by 
adequate migration and border management policies, which take 
human security of migrants into account. It then asks the question 
‘whose security’ is relevant in such a debate – states or humans, 
developed countries or developing countries, countries of 
destination or countries of transit and origin? It suggests that while 
currently policies and practices tend to focus on developed states 
of destination, this has an impact on the effectiveness of policies. 
 
Labelling an issue a security threat has significant implications 
in term of laws, norms, policies and procedures. In the migration 
context, the label has been used to justify harsh and restrictive 
policies. These policies impact the migrants, resulting in inability 
of asylum seekers to access safe countries, migrants smuggling 
and human trafficking, unsafe passages and contributing to a 
growing anti-migrants tendencies.  They also result in a gap 
between the protection that migrants formally enjoy under 
international law (see chapter by Dr. Grech) and the realities they 
experience as they travel and work across different countries.  
Consequently, one also has to note emerging differences between 
the interests of migrants and the states trying to control their 
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movements and entry but also the interests of governments and 
NGOs and civil societies in these countries. 
 
In the Mediterranean, the complexity of the situation, 
characterized by sea borders, weak nation states and conflicts, and 
the recent surge in irregular migration and loss of human life make 
the issue particularly relevant. The current policies of the EU show 
how difficult it is to develop approaches that provide a balanced 
combination of national security and human security perspectives. 
It is possible to reconcile the two perspectives in the 
Mediterranean? There is urgency to the question for Europe and 
the Mediterranean, as some argue that 'Europe’s immigration 
nightmare is only beginning’, given the socio-economic gradient 
and the conflicts that ravage the region. The Mediterranean Sea is 
becoming one of the most militarized and heavily patrolled areas 
of the globe. Current events, such as the drownings of irregular 
migrants and the debate on the maritime operations Mare Nostrum 
and Triton expose the difficulty of the EU in framing the issue. 
 
Apart from proper policies aimed at migration management 
and border management, innovative broad policies aimed at on the 
one hand toning down the aggressive public debate by presenting 
hard facts, and on the other hand to work towards protecting 
human rights and human security of the migrants are needed. They 
must go hand in hand with policies targeting the security 
challenges to developing countries linked to irregular migration, 
and a development agenda which tackles root causes of irregular 
migration. Clearly, for the EU much work lies ahead in crafting 
appropriate migration management and border management 
efforts embedded in such broad policies. But the first step will be 
to acknowledge that its actions so far belied its rhetorical focus on 
the human security of migrants and to start acting in accordance 
with its declared principles and founding documents. 
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